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Global Antitrust and the Evolution of
an International Standard
ABSTRACT

This Note explores recommendations for developing a
global antitrust regime and ultimately rejects those suggestions
in favor of more traditional nationally-based applications of
antitrust rules. Part II introduces an economic model of global
antitrust to show the systemic difficulties inherent in creating a
global regime. Part III contrasts the difficulties in creating a
global regime with the greater historical success of developing
regional antitrust authorities. Part IV tracks the history of the
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws by the United
States and the European Union. Part V argues that the path to
effective global antitrust lies not in the creation of a single
global regime, but in the continued extraterritorialapplication
of national antitrust laws and the further creation of regional
antitrust regimes.
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I. INTRODUCTION

At a conference to celebrate the tenth anniversary of European
Union merger regulation, then-U.S. Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, Joel
Klein, opened a new round in the long push towards coordination of
international antitrust efforts by calling for the creation of a global
organization similar to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) to help coordinate international
competition law convergence and enforcement.'
This declaration
signaled a new opening to develop effective international competition
law enforcement in an increasingly global business environment,
2
particularly between the European Union and the United States.
The plan Klein envisions is a body separate from existing global
organizations, though similar in structure to many. 3
His
recommendation for a separate body is in direct opposition to
proposals made by EU officials to place such an international
4
organization under the auspices of the WTO.
These new attempts mark the sixth major effort to achieve a
truly international antitrust regime. 5 Each prior attempt failed to

1.
DOJ's Klein Calls for Initiative to Set Up Global Competition Organisation,
AFX.com, Sept. 14, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publications,
AFX.com file.
2.
Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalizationof Antitrust Enforcement,
77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 349-52 (1997) (discussing past attempts to achieve a true
international competition law).
3.
Joel Klein & Robert Pitofsky, Press Conference at the International Bar
Association 10th Anniversary Merger Control Conference (Sept. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.useu.be/issues/klein0918.html. In the news conference, Klein specifically
rejected using any existing global body to coordinate antitrust efforts because "the
global issues in competition policy are much broader than any [international]
organization is now looking at." Id.
4.
See id. Klein's opposition to the EU proposal stems from his belief that
international antitrust is an issue broader than one that the WTO can effectively
handle. He sees the role of the WTO as one that looks at issues "affecting world trade
and trade liberalization," whereas international competition law concerns issues such
as multi-jurisdictional merger review that are separate from the trade issues the WTO
confronts. Id.
5.
See Waller, supra note 2. The prior five attempts have been: (1) during the
formation of the League of Nations; (2) after World War II with the creation of the
International Trade Organization; (3) the development of the United Nations
Economic and Social Council in the 1950s; (4) the formation of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and (5) the development of the non-
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one degree or another. 6 Persuasive commentators have suggested
that the primary cause of the past failures has been a difference of
expectations on the part of the relevant state actors. 7
Other
measures of the failure to achieve effective international antitrust can
be seen by contrasting the highly-developed national antitrust
schemes with the near-total lack of an effective international
8
antitrust regime.
These failed attempts to standardize international antitrust
regimes have taken on multiple hues. Some proposals, like ones that
presently exist between the United States and the European Union,
call for cooperation between existing national and regional antitrust
enforcement authorities. 9
Such agreements call for antitrust
authorities to respect the antitrust jurisdictions of competing
authorities and, where possible, share information and theories on
antitrust liability and enforcement. 10
Other proposals call for
coordination of antitrust enforcement among different authorities."
For example, the international coordination agency proposed by Klein
would aid multiple antitrust authorities in bringing joint antitrust
actions against defendants. 12 The most radical solutions call for
harmonization of the antitrust laws of different countries. 13 These
proposals would require countries to standardize their antitrust laws
14
to a single global norm.
There is a major impetus to develop effective global international
antitrust regimes. Primarily, global business organizations have a
need for effective global antitrust. 15 The present system, in which
global business entities must seek antitrust approval from a variety of
enforcement authorities to merge, imposes enormous deadweight
costs on these organizations 16 that could be alleviated if there were a

binding rules of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). Id.
6.
Id. at 349.
7.
See, e.g., id. at 351. Professor Waller believes that, on the one hand,
developed countries have come to the bargaining table seeking to establish real
antitrust law, whereas less-developed countries sought rules about economic
development and control of multinational corporations. Id.
8.
See id. at 347-48.
9.
Id. at 368-70.
10.
Id. at 371.
11.
Id. at 358, 368.
12.
See Klein & Pitofsky, supra note 3.
13.
Waller, supra note 2, at 346-47.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 385-89.
16.
While outside of the antitrust merger realm, the case of Microsoft is
instructive. To alleviate the costs of conducting separate antitrust proceedings
Microsoft agreed to permit the United States and the European Union to share
confidential information in the proceedings that led to a 1995 consent decree. See, e.g.,
Laura E. Keegan, The 1991 U.S. IEC Competition Agreement: A Glimpse of the Future
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global standard for antitrust compliance. 17 Furthermore, these
failures in the antitrust arena stand in sharp contrast to more
successful efforts to standardize international business law in other
18

areas.

This Note explores past failures to achieve effective global
antitrust standards and proposes a method to develop, over the long
run, an effective global antitrust regime. Part II employs an economic
analysis to explain why there are systemic difficulties in adopting
global antitrust norms and why regional efforts to coordinate
antitrust policy are, all else being equal, more likely to succeed than
global efforts. Assuming that each national antitrust authority is a
rational utility-maximizer of its country's interests, it will seek the
mix of antitrust enforcement that maximizes its constituents' total
welfare. From this premise, the economic model of antitrust draws
numerous conclusions. First, a workable global antitrust system like
the one proposed by Klein is not a feasible solution to global antitrust
issues because it is unlikely that the parties could ever agree on such
a system.
Second, the model suggests that regional antitrust
agreements between authorities in competing jurisdictions provide a
more workable scenario for international antitrust agreement.
Finally, the model shows that in the absence of a single global
antitrust authority, the most likely scenario for exercising an efficient
level of antitrust is through the extraterritorial application of
antitrust laws to companies in foreign jurisdictions.
Part III contrasts past failures to develop a global antitrust
regime with the more successful, albeit more modest, success
achieved in brokering regional antitrust agreements. Efforts to
develop a single global system under the auspices of both the WTO
and OECD, along with an entirely separate body to consider only
global antitrust matters, are analyzed, criticized, and ultimately
rejected.
These systems are then contrasted with regional
agreements, both within the larger context of NAFTA and separately,
as is the case with U.S.-EU agreements on antitrust. The section
concludes that the economic model of antitrust is a powerful tool to
analyze global versus regional antitrust agreements.
Part IV explores the extraterritorial application of U.S. and EU
antitrust law. Over the last half-century the United States has taken
a strong stand in applying its antitrust laws to both domestic and
Through the United States v. Microsoft Corp. Window, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 149,
167-73 (1996).

17.
The costs imposed on business stem from compliance with multiple
different antitrust standards and laws in different countries. See Waller, supra note 2,
at 385-86. Often these standards are not in harmony; occasionally they are in direct
conflict.
18.

See, e.g., William P. Connolly, Note, Lessons to be Learned: The Conflict in

InternationalAntitrust Law Contrasted with Progress in InternationalFinancialLaw,
6 FORDHAM J. COMP. & FIN. L. 207 (2001).
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foreign corporations. 19 The European Union, more recently,( has
followed suit. 20 This section considers the possibility that other
countries and regional antitrust alliances will adopt the U.S. and EU
standards of extraterritoriality within the framework of the economic
model developed in Part II.
Part V argues that, over the short-term, the path to effective
international antitrust lies in developing and enhancing stronger
regional antitrust regimes that adopt the U.S.' standard of rigorous
It then argues for forbearance by
extraterritorial enforcement.
national and regional antitrust enforcers when a competing antitrust
authority seeks to apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially to a
domestic defendant. Over time, developing strong regional antitrust
regimes and prosecuting alleged antitrust offenders wherever they
may be found will lead to a world convergence of antitrust standards.
Once global antitrust standards distill to a few strong regional
policies applied extraterritorially, a world consensus may develop
over what antitrust policy should be. At that point, and only at that
point, will it be possible to develop an effective global organization for
prosecution of antitrust laws.

II. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL ANTITRUST
Seen through the eyes of an economist, there is a globallyefficient level of antitrust. 21 The globally-efficient level is that
"amount" of antitrust enforcement that maximizes overall world
welfare by balancing (1) the efficiency gains from economies of scale
that are created by larger firms against (2) the output reduction
associated with allowing larger firms to exercise market power. 22 As
a prescriptive ideal, the economist seeks to achieve that level of global
antitrust where the marginal costs of additional size are just equal to
23
the marginal benefits.

See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
19.
1945) (Second Circuit sitting as a court of final appeal on certification from the U.S.
Supreme Court).
20.
See infra notes 183-221 and accompanying text (exploring the
circumstances under which the European Union has sought to apply its competition
rules extraterritorially).
21.
For an excellent and detailed exposition of the economic view of
international antitrust, see Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501 (1998); see also Jeffrey L. Danoff & Joel P. Trachtman,
Economic Analysis of InternationalLaw, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1999).
Id. at 1509-10.
22.
Generally, the efficient level of "production" of any product is that level
23.
where the social cost of producing the last unit is just equal to the social benefit
derived from producing that unit. For a general explanation of the role of marginal
analysis in economic theory, see ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR
(1996).
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The obstacle to achieving effective international antitrust,
according to the economist, is political.2 4 World antitrust is played
out largely along national lines, where national officials pursue
national antitrust policies that maximize the welfare of their national
constituents. 25 In pursuing a national antitrust policy on a worldwide
scale, the global "amount" of antitrust policy is skewed from its
efficient level-some nations will pursue too much antitrust policy;
26
others will pursue too little.
The simplified economic model of international antitrust
assumes a world of two countries, one that only produces a particular
good and the other that only consumes that good. 27 Each country will
pursue an antitrust policy that maximizes the welfare of its
constituents. 28 Thus, the producer country will adopt an antitrust
policy that maximizes the welfare of producers-it will seek to
maximize producer profit. 29 The consumer country, on the other
hand, will seek to maximize the welfare of consumers by adopting
antitrust policies designed to keep the price of the good as low as
possible-it will try to minimize producer profits and transfer the
30
surplus to consumers.
International antitrust problems arise when two firms in the
producer country seek to merge. 31 Imagine a merger between the two
firms that would lead to both an increase in productive efficiency and
an increase in the market power of the combined firm. If the increase
in efficiency leads to reduced costs of one hundred and fifty dollars,
but also to increased market power that will reduce production by
fifty dollars, world surplus from the proposed merger would increase
by one hundred dollars. 32 Therefore, from a global perspective, the
merger is desirable. However, because antitrust policy is conducted
on a national level, the worldwide efficient solution-allowing the
merger to proceed-may not be achieved. Instead, while antitrust

24.
What is meant by political is that there are many different competing
values to be considered beyond the economist's preoccupation with efficiency. In the
world of political reality, efficiency in law may not be the only value-it may not even
be the most important one.
25.
Guzman, supra note 21, at 1510-12.
26.
Id. at 1548.
27.
Id. at 1512.
28.
That government antitrust enforcers will pursue welfare-maximizing
policies for their constituents is an assumption of the economic model of international
antitrust. Id. at 1510-12. Obviously, this assumption may not be entirely correct. For
example, capture theory might suggest that government enforcers may be beholden to
particular sub-constituencies. Others might argue that officials pursue a policy that
maximizes their own bureaucratic self-interest.
29.
Id. at 1512-14.
30.
Id. at 1514-15.
31.
Id. at 1517.
32.
Id. The world gain from the merger is equal to the gains from increased
efficiency ($150) less the production loss due to market power ($50), a net world gain

of $100.
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authorities in the producer country will seek to permit the merger
because it increases the welfare of its producers, the antitrust
authorities in the consumer country would seek to block the merger
because it reduces the welfare of its consumers.
The ultimate
resolution of the issue will depend on the power of the consumer
country's antitrust authorities to block the merger through the
extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws in the producer
country.3 3 This implies that any global antitrust agreement between
these two countries is unlikely.3 4 The interests of the consumer
country directly conflict with the interests of the producer economy,
and any benefit to one country will be offset by costs to the other.
A more nuanced view of the world economy sees a world with
many countries that are both producers and consumers of many
different goods. If there is a proposed merger between firms in one
country, how will other countries react in order to maximize their
own welfare? Assuming that the proposed merger leads to both
greater efficiency and more market power, but increased market
power enables the firm to reduce quantity and therefore impose a
higher price, the antitrust authorities in the producer country will
inevitably be at odds with the antitrust authorities in all consumer
countries. 35 Even if the merger would be desirable from a global
welfare perspective, it is unlikely that the two authorities will reach
an agreement on the fate of the merger.
Taken at a greater level of generality, one can conclude that:
A country whose firms are responsible for x% of global production will
take into account x% of the change in global producer surplus
generated by a particular activity. A country whose consumers
account for y% of global consumption will take into account y% of the
36
total change in global consumer surplus generated by the activity.

That is, in shaping and enforcing its antitrust laws, an enforcement
agency will only take into consideration that amount of the total
relevant global activity that occurs within its borders.3 7 Thus, the
globally efficient level of antitrust will be achieved only when the
total amount of domestic consumption of a particular good is equal to
the total amount of domestic production. Any deviation from this,
however, would lead one to predict that the actual amount of

33.
See id. at 1523-24. The power of the consumer country to block the merger
will depend on the power it has to affect the producer country negatively. If, for
example, the consumer country is the only consumer of the producer country's good
and if it can make a credible threat that it will ban the import of the producer's good if
the merger is consummated, it is likely that the producer country would block the
merger because it would then have no market in which to sell its goods and producer
welfare would fall. See id.
34.
Id. at 1524.
35.
Id. at 1519-21.
36.
Id. at 1520.
37.
Id.
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antitrust regulation sought is different from the globally optimal
38
amount.
The general conclusion follows that net-importer countries will
tend to over-regulate antitrust enforcement while net exporters will
39
This model of rational
tend to under-regulate enforcement.
countries will tend to
of
these
each
that
suggests
antitrust behavior
40
of enforcement.
level
ideal
the
as
see
they
what
in
be far apart
Therefore, each will have little incentive to cooperate in their
antitrust proceedings; cooperation can only hurt each of them.
antitrust
Economic analysis thus demonstrates that international
41
cooperation will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
A. The Rational Antitrust Authority and Extraterritoriality
The economic model of international antitrust assumes that
countries possess equal amounts of power to impose their views of
optimal antitrust policy on others. In reality, different countries have
the market for antitrust
different degrees of leverage in
enforcement. 42 The difference in power leads to different conclusions
43
Countries
about the "natural" amount of antitrust enforcement.
that are more "powerful" will have a greater ability to impose their
antitrust laws on others than will less "powerful" countries.
The power to enforce laws extraterritorially depends on the
relative attractiveness of a country's domestic market to foreign
producers. 44 If a country seeks to apply its laws extraterritorially, the
only power of compulsion that it has against foreign firms is denial of

Id. at 1519. Again, the globally efficient level of antitrust is that level
38.
which maximizes total global welfare by balancing the increased efficiency of a merger
on the one hand against the increased market power (i.e., the power to reduce output
and cause the price to rise) on the other. If a country produces more than it consumes,
there will be an incentive for the rational antitrust authority to pursue a less than
ideal "amount" of antitrust enforcement because the authority will predominantly
weigh the interests of the merging businesses and will want them to be able to merge
to increase market power and profits. Likewise, in a country that consumes more
than it produces, the rational antitrust authority will pursue more than the globally
efficient level of antitrust because that country will seek to avoid a potential merger
where the increased market power of the firm will raise prices and thus reduce the
consumer welfare of the consuming country's constituents. It follows, then, that the
only time when a national antitrust authority will pursue globally optimal antitrust
policies is when its consumption of the relevant good equals its production. See id.
Id. at 1520. Net importers are those countries that consume more than
39.
they produce and net exporters are countries that produce more than they consume.
See id. at 1525.
Id. at 1520.
40.
Id. at 1525.
41.
Id. at 1528.
42.
See id. at 1528-29 (discussing the implications of an imbalance of power on
43.
any resulting agreement).
Id. at 1529.
44.
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If the country seeking to enforce its laws
market access. 45
extraterritorially has a large domestic market, and if foreign firms
are greatly dependent on that market, there is a better chance that
the country will succeed in applying its laws extraterritorially 46 than
if the country were small with relatively unattractive domestic
markets. 47 Where the cost to the company of the country's antitrust
regulation is greater than the benefit provided by participating in
that market, the firm will decline to participate in the market and the
country will have no power to enforce its laws extraterritorially. 48
Similarly, when the country is large enough, the market broad
enough, and the need of the company to be in the market great
enough, the country will be able to enforce its antitrust laws
extraterritorially. 49 The country has that ability where the cost to the
affected foreign firm of antitrust compliance is less than the value of
being in that country's market. 50 At that point, a rational firm will
accept the country's antitrust laws because the benefits are greater
than the costs. 5 ' Thus, the general conclusion is that the degree to
which a country can impose its antitrust laws extraterritorially is a
function of the country's size and the attractiveness of its marketplace
52
to foreign firms.
Consider the case of the country that cannot ever apply its
antitrust laws extraterritorially and assume that, for a particular
good, there are two producers, one inside and one outside of the
country. If the country is unable to apply its antitrust laws
extraterritorially then it will only be able to apply them to the
domestic producer. Assume further that both the domestic firm and
the foreign firm seek to merge with separate third parties and that
these mergers would produce a net global welfare loss. From the
global perspective, it is optimal to have the country block the one
merger that it can-the merger of its domestic firm. From the
country's perspective, however, that may not be optimal. If it were to
block the merger, then only the foreign merger will proceed. The
foreign merger will reduce consumer welfare through higher prices,
because the foreign firm will increase in size and market power.
Meanwhile, the domestic firm will be harmed because it now occupies
a weaker competitive position relative to the potentially merged
foreign firm. In order to increase its own welfare, the country will

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 1507.
Id. at 1506.
Id.
Id. at 1507.
Id.
Id.

Id.
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seek to aid the domestic firm 53 by approving the merger of the

domestic firm. It will do so despite the fact that, from a global
perspective, the merger is welfare reducing, because the new, larger
domestic firm will have greater scale to compete with the newly
merged foreign firm.
From the above example, one can conclude that countries
without the power to enforce their antitrust laws extraterritorially
will regulate antitrust matters less than the globally optimum level.
Were they to block domestic mergers that reduced global welfare,
they would be hurt because they bear the full cost of reduced profits
for the domestic firm, but they only share a portion of the benefits of
increased consumer welfare through lower prices and higher output.
Thus, "strict domestic [antitrust enforcement] policy without
extraterritoriality tends to prevent local firms from engaging in
profit-increasing anticompetitive activities but does not prevent
foreign firms from reducing domestic consumer surplus.

'54

As

countries are rational utility-maximizers, where a country does not
have the power to assert its antitrust laws extraterritorially, one
would expect that country to adopt antitrust policies that are
substantially more lenient than the globally optimal antitrust
policy. 55 One can then conclude that, where possible, extraterritorial
application of antitrust laws is "good" policy when it more closely
aligns domestic and global antitrust interests and leads to antitrust
enforcement at a level that is closer to the ideal global level than
56
when there is no extraterritoriality.
B. Suggestions for Achieving Effective Global Antitrust with a
Rational National Antitrust Authority

The economic analysis of global antitrust enforcement further
suggests that agreements to harmonize antitrust laws and
enforcement across countries will be difficult, because one country's
gain from antitrust enforcement is often another country's loss. 57 The
economist concludes, therefore, that the present level of antitrust

Assume for purposes of the analysis that the welfare of the country will
53.
increase if the domestic merger is consummated. That is, the increase in profit to the
merged firm outweighs the loss in consumer welfare to domestic consumers.
54.
Id. at 1523.
55.
Id. at 1524.
56.
It may be the case that where countries can assert extraterritorial
application of their antitrust laws they will regulate antitrust more than the globally
optimal level. Id. However, extraterritorial application of antitrust laws comes closer
to meeting the global ideal than no extraterritoriality because the country has more of
an incentive and ability to consider the global impact of possible antitrust
enforcement.
See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
57.
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enforcement is not globally optimal. 58 There are different levels of
enforcement, however, that will increase global welfare. 59 It would
seem possible that agreements could be brokered to overcome these
inherent difficulties and achieve a level of antitrust enforcement
closer to the global ideal.
The economic model suggests that net importers will overregulate antitrust enforcement and net exporters will under-regulate
it. 60 It also suggests that an international antitrust agreement will
not be in many countries' interests.6 1 Modest proposals should be
suggested instead. First, the model suggests that agreement is more
likely where the proposals do not substantively change the underlying
antitrust laws. 62 Information-sharing arrangements such as those
that already exist between the United States and the European
Union or the United States and Canada are examples of such
agreements. 63 These agreements generally call for (1) notification to
one antitrust authority from the other where there is a contemplated
action that may affect the other's interests, and (2) sharing of nonconfidential information. 64 These types of agreements are likely to
proliferate because, as globalization increases, it will be more difficult
for any single antitrust authority to enforce its antitrust laws without
coordinated information sharing. 65 Such information sharing merely
provides for better enforcement under existing laws and would not
66
hurt any country's vital enforcement interests.
Another possible solution suggested by the model is to make
transfer payments from countries that would benefit from a joint
antitrust agreement to countries that are hurt by the joint
agreement. 67 The transfer payments need not be monetary.68 For

58.
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (concluding that countries
tend to over-regulate or under-regulate depending on their status as a net importer or
a net exporter).
59.
See supra note 56
and accompanying
text (explaining how
extraterritoriality leads to antitrust enforcement that is closer to the global ideal).
60.
Guzman, supranote 21, at 1542.
61.
Id.
62.
See id. at 1542-43.
63.
For more on information sharing agreements, see infra notes 126-33 and
accompanying text (considering the agreement between the United States and the
European Union on information sharing).
64.
Guzman, supranote 21, at 1543.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. at 1544.
68.
Id. at 1545. The only requirement, from an economic standpoint, is that
countries that are made better off by joint antitrust agreements provide some value to
countries that are made worse off by the agreement. For example, the country made
better off could make trade concessions to the country made worse off by the
agreement.
Because international antitrust agreements are not zero-sum
interactions, such transfer payments can be Pareto efficient-i.e., they can make all
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example, countries can negotiate on a wide range of topics, including
joint antitrust enforcement itself.69 Countries that benefit from joint
antitrust could make concessions in other areas of international trade
70
to countries that are hurt by the agreement.
The model also suggests that agreements between countries of
fundamentally similar import-export backgrounds are the most likely
to succeed.7 1 Net importers tend to over-regulate and net exporters
tend to under-regulate antitrust.7 2 Therefore, for example, a joint
antitrust agreement between net importers will be more likely to
succeed than an agreement between a net importer and a net
exporter.7 3 As there is less of a difference between net importers than
a net importer and a net exporter, such an agreement between net
importers would require a "smaller . . . compensatory transfer
payment . . . from countries that benefit from the agreement to
' 74
countries that do not.
Finally, the model cautions that any proposal for worldwide joint
antitrust is likely to fail and those agreements that succeed are likely
to be negotiated among small groups of countries, perhaps even
between only two countries. 75 This is so because the smaller the
negotiating group, the less the difference will be among them on what
an optimal antitrust policy should look like. According to the model,
bilateral agreements are most likely to succeed; however, if
multilateral agreements are sought, they should be among the
76
smallest number of countries possible.
In sum, the economic model postulates a model of rational
behavior on the part of world antitrust authorities.7 7 Based on the
varying trade balances of different countries, the model predicts that
international antitrust coordination agreements will be difficult to
broker.78 To overcome this problem, the model recommends that, if
possible, countries should seek to make bilateral or regional antitrust
agreements.7 9 Authorities should make agreements part of wide-

participants better off without making any worse off. See also infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
69.
Id. "Wide ranging negotiations" are one means of achieving Paretoefficient solutions. By widening the spectrum of topics to be discussed, it is possible
for countries that benefit from international antitrust agreements to make concessions
on other matters to countries that would be hurt by such antitrust agreements. Id. at
1545-46; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
70.
Guzman, supra note 21, at 1546.
71.
Id.
72.
Id. at 1520.
73.
Id. at 1546.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id. at 1547.
77.
See supranotes 24-26 and accompanying text.
78.
Guzman, supra note 21, at 1548.
79.
See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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ranging negotiations that cover the full gamut of international trade
policy issues. If need be, countries should be willing to make transfer
payments to secure agreement on a world antitrust solution. The

model also recommends; where possible, countries should apply their
antitrust laws extraterritorially, as the extraterritorial application of
the laws brings the total level of enforcement8 0 closer to the optimal
level of enforcement, from a global perspective.

III. REGIONAL VERSUS GLOBAL ANTITRUST AGREEMENTS AND REGIMES
CONSIDERED

The current dim prospects for developing a global authority to
oversee the enforcement of antitrust policy stand in sharp contrast to
the relative success of regional antitrust agreements. This section
first examines the global regimes that have been proposed. It then
contrasts them with regional regimes.
A. Global Regimes
Proposals for a global authority to oversee antitrust enforcement
take two forms. First, there are proposals, made mostly by the
European Union, to house a global antitrust authority inside an
existing global institution such as the OECD or the WTO.' l Other
proposals, such as the one embraced by Klein, suggest the creation of
a new global body responsible for the adoption of global antitrust
standards.8 2 Due to institutional structures and dynamics, in
addition to the underlying structure of the international system, it is
antitrust authority could be
doubtful that an effective 8global
3
developed under either model.
Commentators have been critical of proposals to house a new
global antitrust authority within an existing institution,8 4 arguing
that such institutions are structured poorly to manage global
antitrust enforcement successfully. 8 5

These criticisms focus on the

institutional structure presently in place in organizations like the
WTO and the OECD and contrast it with8 6the ideal institutional
characteristics of a global antitrust authority.

80.
Id. at 1523.
81.
See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition
Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478, 478 (2000).
Klein & Pitofsky, supra note 3.
82.
83.
See infra notes 87-117 and accompanying text (describing the institutional
structure and dynamics of the WTO and OECD).
See Klein & Pitofsky, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
84.
See, e.g., Tarullo, supra note 81, at 479.
85.
Id.
86.
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The WTO is an institution set up to focus on global trade
practices.8 7 There is a tension and a difference between global trade
policy and global competition policy. 88
The norms of global
competition policy are incompatible with the norms of global trade
policy.8 9 This is the crux of the argument for not permitting the WTO
to house a global antitrust authority. Trade policy is based on a
government's efforts to encourage its domestic industries to export.90
In contrast, competition policy is concerned with industry structures
and practices that reduce output and thereby raise price. 91 Stated
differently, trade policy promotes the interests of an individual
competitor while competition
policy promotes the interests of
92
competitive markets.
In proposing that the WTO house a global antitrust authority,
the European Commission suggested goals and proposals for such an
organization within the WTO that include:
(1) [Mlandating that Member States enact and maintain domestic
competition laws that include at least core prohibitions against cartels
and monopolization; (2) requiring that the legislation be enforced based
on the principles of nondiscrimination and transparency; (3) providing
for cooperation between competition and antitrust authorities; and (4)
93
aiming for the gradual convergence of different national practices.

Commentators do not dispute these goals; they only question whether
an organization such as the WTO can achieve them. 94 The WTO is
set up as a statutory and adjudicatory body 95 where Member States
negotiate detailed regulations to restrain unfair trade practices of
96
governments, specifically the erection of unreasonably high tariffs.
To vindicate these rights, a quasi-political-judicial proceeding is held
where there are not only legal findings, but also diplomatic efforts to
97
resolve disputes between contesting governments.
An organization with these attributes is not well suited to police
global competition issues. First, competition laws ordinarily seek to
prevent or remedy conduct by private organization, not
governments.9 8 An institution set up to police interference with trade

87.
See generally id. at 479-85.
88.
Id. at 483.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Tarullo, supra note 81, at 485.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 487.
96.
Id. at 484-88.
97.
Id. at 480. Over time, the dispute resolution process has taken on more of
a judicial "flavor;" however, there is still a significant political proceeding to try to
resolve the contested issues. Id.
98.
Id. at 483.
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flows is not institutionally arranged to switch easily to policing the
conduct of private organizations with no control over trade barriers. 99
Second, antitrust statutes, such as the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act in the United States and Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome, are written in general terms and depend on lawyers and
judges to provide far more interpretation and meaning to them than
the specific trade regulations that are the product of the WTO. 10 0
Thus, there is established around the antitrust statutes a significant
body of case-specific, fact intensive, interpretive common law, which
does not exist with WTO regulations. 01
Finally, the judicial procedures within the WTO are not well
suited to adjudicate cases that would arise under a global antitrust
authority. 10 2 The quasi-diplomatic nature of the proceedings in the
WTO is tailored to deal with disputes between countries where the
norms of international relations predominate. 10 3
Antitrust

proceedings, which invariably involve one or more private
corporations, do not involve the same international relations
concerns. 10 4 A judicial system set up under the norms of the WTO to
enforce a global antitrust regime is likely to fail because of the
difference between the norms of the institution and the needs of the
105
system.
Institutional concerns may also undermine the effectiveness of
the OECD as an enforcement arm for a global antitrust regime.
Unlike the WTO, the OECD is set up as an organization for
cooperation and discussion for all major areas of economic policy.' 0 6
As such, there is no single organizing, unifying theme in the OECD
and it lacks a well-defined constituency at the national level. 10 7 This
has led some to describe the OECD as the "overlooked sibling"'1 8 of
world organizations, relative to the WTO and the IMF. 10 9 The
OECD's basic organizational weakness means that, in practice, it does
not and cannot play the regulatory and adjudicatory role that the
WTO plays. 110 Instead, it has been used as an organization to
develop relationships among regulators around the world."' It has
been most effective in the past at developing sets of recommendations

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 489.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 491.
Id.

104.

See, e.g., id.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id.
Id. at 494-95.
See id. at 494.
Id. at 495.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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for nations to follow; however, it does not possess the power to enforce
or mandate those recommendations. 11 2 For example, one of the great
successes of the OECD has been the Competition Law and Policy
Committee, which developed suggestions for regulatory convergence
of antitrust laws." 3 No matter how effective the suggestions may be,
114
however, the Committee lacks the power of enforcement.
The OECD has a role to play in the development of global
antitrust, but it is institutionally incompetent to serve as the
regulator of a global antitrust regime. Such an enforcement role is
inherently adversarial; whereas, the OECD is cooperative. 115 It does
not have the regulatory or adjudicatory processes to consider
competing global antitrust policies properly, nor does it have the
means to apply them to individual cases. 116 Furthermore, turning to
the OECD as the body to enforce global antitrust norms risks
undermining the positive role that it currently plays in coordinating
world economic development, turning it from a consensus building,
non-adversarial, policy-advising body to an adversarial dispute1 17
resolver with the power to make binding decisions.
In sum, suggestions to house a global antitrust authority within
an existing global institution should be met with a skeptical eye. In
addition to these inherent structural problems in reaching any global
antitrust agreement, there are additional concerns over the
institutional competencies of existing global authorities to consider
global antitrust issues properly.
Existing global agencies are
premised on adjudicating disputes and advocating policies among
countries.118 The diplomatic-style missions of these agencies are
incompatible with the regulatory and adjudicative role that a global
antitrust regime must play." 9 Thus, even assuming the inherent
problems of global antitrust could be overcome, it would be unwise to
turn to existing global organizations to develop and apply that global
antitrust policy.
B. Regional Regimes
Regionally based efforts to standardize antitrust proceedings and
enforcement have been more successful.
Efforts to coordinate
antitrust enforcement among regional antitrust peers are nearly a

112. Id. at 494-96.
113.
Id. at 495.
114.
Id. at 498.
115.
See id. at 494, 497.
116. Id. at 497.
117.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Tarullo, supra note 81, at 488-89 (discussing this premise, using
the example of the WTO).
119.
See id. at 489.
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century old.1 20 The United States alone has negotiated regional
antitrust agreements with many nations, including the European
Union, Canada, and Australia. 121 The entire European Union is itself
a regional antitrust authority. 1 22 The economic model predicts that
these types of regional agreements should be easier to broker and
implement because the regional parties have relatively more aligned
antitrust interests.1 23 The model also holds that authorities should
make agreements through wide-ranging negotiations on a series of
international economic issues that will allow for transfer payments on
non-antitrust issues to nations that are hurt by the regional
agreements.1 24 In practice, the United States has sought out such
regional antitrust arrangements, both as125 part of wide-ranging
negotiations and as stand-alone agreements.
The regional agreement that has attracted the most attention
from commentators is the agreement reached between the United
States and the European Union in 1991.126 The agreement, while not
the product of wide-ranging negotiations, aims 'to overcome (1)
conflicts between competition authorities, (2) obstacles to information
gathering in foreign jurisdictions, and (3) differing rules under which
firms must abide. 127 The agreement is fashioned after the 1986
on
OECD Recommendations. 128 The parties sought to make binding
129
It
themselves these otherwise non-binding recommendations.
includes standard clauses for such regional agreements, such as a
notification clause, an information exchange clause, and a negative

120.

One of the earliest known coordination efforts occurred between the

United States and Canada in 1901. The investigation involved alleged price fixing in
the Canadian market in the newsprint industry. Investigators coordinated evidence
gathering in Montreal, Toronto, and New York and successfully prosecuted the price
From the fruits of the initial joint investigation came additional
fixing case.
prosecutions in the United States. Lawson A.W. Hunter, Q.C. & Susan M. Hutton,
Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way: Cooperation in Canada-U.S. Antitrust
Relations, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 101, 101-02 (1994).
See id. at 112 (outlining cooperation between the countries' antitrust
121.
enforcers).
That is, the European Union is a regional association of countries that
122.
have negotiated a system of competition laws that are applicable throughout the
European Union and have been applied extraterritorially. See Guzman, supra note
21, at 1537-38.
Id. at 1546.
123.
Id. at 1545.
124.
See id. at 1537.
125.
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
126.
the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their
Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-Eur. Comm., 30 I.L.M. 1491 [hereinafter
Agreement].
Keegan, supra note 16, at 159.
127.
Agreement, supra note 126, at 1491.
128.
Keegan, supra note 16, at 162.
129.
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comity clause.' 3 0 It also includes what many have called its most
innovative feature-a positive comity clause that permits either
jurisdiction to request that the other consider prosecuting a particular
case.1 31 It further imposes a duty on the jurisdiction that receives a
request to make a good faith decision on whether or not to pursue the
Antitrust regulators have applauded the
proposed action.13 2
agreement and noted that, in part because of the agreement,
133
cooperation between the two authorities is at an all-time high.
The economic model of international antitrust lends support to
the strong arrangements that exist between the United States and
the European Union. The model suggests that even more progress
could have been made had the agreement been part of negotiations
The
across a wider array of international economic subjects. 34
success of the agreement, which is praised on both sides of the
in a system
Atlantic, underlines the degree of inefficiency inherent
35
where antitrust is based solely on national borders.
The U.S. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of
1994 has aided efforts to increase the number and quality of regional
antitrust agreements. 3 6 The Act delegates to the Antitrust Division
of the Justice Department the power to negotiate binding bilateral
agreements between the United States and other jurisdictions over
antitrust enforcement matters.1 3 7 These agreements provide for the
exchange of information between authorities where confidentiality
laws might otherwise prohibit the exchange.13 8 Agreements under
the Act also include provisions that permit antitrust authorities in
one country to have access to information and evidence to aid a
39
pending case or investigation.1

130.
The negative comity clause states that each jurisdiction should take heed
of the prerogatives of the other jurisdiction when prosecuting cases that might
implicate their jurisdiction. While this is a part of the formal legal agreement, the
degree to which either the United States or the European Union practices the tenets
of negative comity in reality is questionable. See infra note 173 and accompanying
text; see also Keegan, supra note 16, at 163.
Id. at 165.
131.
132.
Id.
See Klein & Pitofsky, supra note 3.
133.
134.
For a discussion of the value of wide-ranging negotiations, see supra note
123 and accompanying text.
135.
The agreement is presumably Pareto-efficient, otherwise neither authority
would have an incentive to enter into the agreement. That each could be made better
off by the agreement and neither be made worse off indicates that there are
efficiencies that can be "wrung out" of the present system. For a discussion of Pareto
efficiency, see supra notes 68-69.
136.
15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-12 (1994).
137.
Id. § 6202(b) (1994).
138.
Id.
139.
Id.; see also Charles S. Stark, International Antitrust Cooperation in
NAFTA The InternationalAntitrust Assistance Act of 1994, 4 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 169, 175
(1996).
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Authorities have also pursued efforts to adopt bilateral
agreements with other jurisdictions through wide ranging
negotiations, such as within the NAFTA framework. The United
States and Canada have long had a close working relationship in
antitrust enforcement. More recently, the United States has engaged
Mexico within the NAFTA framework to come to joint understanding
on the application of antitrust laws. 140 While the engagement is only
in a nascent stage, it is these types of bilateral agreements, where
antitrust agreements are part of broader negotiations over
international economic policy, that the economic model predicts will
be most successful in bringing about substantive harmony between
competing antitrust jurisdictions.141

IV.

THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND ASSERTIONS OF

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS

This section considers efforts by the two superpowers of world
antitrust regimes, the European Union and the United States, to
It begins by
apply their antitrust legislation extraterritorially.
examining the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law, and
then turns to EU efforts to apply their antitrust laws
extraterritorially. It concludes that while both groups initially sought
to minimize extraterritoriality, subsequent cases have pushed both
regimes further toward international extraterritorial application of
antitrust laws.
A. The ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Antitrust Law
The history of the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws is
marked by shifting standards and general confusion. 142 Major world
antitrust authorities, particularly the United States and the
European Union, generally seek to apply their antitrust law to any
firm, either domestic or foreign, that "affects" their domestic
market. 143 This general global antitrust jurisdiction doctrine is
marked more by its exceptions than its consistencies, however.

140.
Stark, supra note 139, at 175.
141.
See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
142.
See, e.g., James S. McNeill, Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction:
Continuing the Confusion in Policy, Law, and Jurisdiction,28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 425
(1998).
See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416
143.
(2d Cir. 1945). Learned Hand adopted the "effects" rule in the Alcoa case. Id. Under
the basic rule, a court may assert jurisdiction in an antitrust case over any firm, either
foreign or domestic, where that firm has intended to affect and actually has affected
that jurisdiction's domestic market. Id.
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The U.S. Supreme Court first considered the extraterritorial
application the U.S. antitrust laws in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co.144 where the Court held that U.S. courts had no jurisdiction
over the alleged Sherman Act antitrust violation, because the actions
did not occur within the United States. 145 In Justice Holmes'
formulation, "the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law in the country where the act is
done."'1 46 More generally, arguments of national sovereignty swayed
the Court. 147 In the Court's view, the interest in applying antitrust
laws to activity that occurred outside of the United States did not
outweigh the interest in preserving principles of comity 148 in the
international sphere. 149 Under American Banana, the Sherman Act
can only be applied to activity that occurred on U.S. soil and could
never be applied to activity occurring outside the United States, even
150
where all of the relevant participants are U.S. corporations.
Despite its apparent parsimony, American Banana hinted at
many of the jurisdictional issues and problems that would mark later
extraterritorial U.S. antitrust litigation. 15 1 These issues broke into
full view in United States v. Alcoa. 152 The issue before the court in
Alcoa was whether Congress intended U.S. antitrust laws to apply to
parties located outside the United States. 15 3 Judge Learned Hand
declared that, "It is settled law . . . that any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the
state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily

144.
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In
American Banana, the plaintiff, a U.S.-based banana trader in Costa Rica, claimed the
defendant, also a U.S.-based banana trader in Costa Rica that held a virtual monopoly
in the market, violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by engaging in anticompetitive
practices in the Costa Rican banana trading market. Id. at 354-55.
145.
Id. at 358-59.
146.
Id. at 356.
147.
Id. at 357-58.
148.
The concept of comity is that, in applying its laws, a country should
consider the interests and impacts on other sovereigns by applying those laws. See,
e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). Generally speaking, comity means
respect and deference to other countries in applying laws where there may be a
detrimental effect on that other sovereign.
149.
American Banana, 213 U.S. at 358.
150.
Id. at 357.
151.
The jurisdictional difficulty that the Court confronted was whether
considerations of comity should outweigh the Court's interest in applying the antitrust
laws to the case before it. Id. at 357-59. The Court resolved this conflict by stating
that comity concerns should be paramount and that courts should not consider the
interests of applying the antitrust laws where comity issues arose. Id.
152.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Alcoa concerned an agreement formed outside the United States by two non-U.S.
companies that limited the imports of aluminum ingot into the United States. See id.
at 439-41.
153.
Id. at 443.
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recognize." 154 From this general proposition Judge Hand derived the
"intended effects" doctrine, which holds that U.S. courts may properly
assert antitrust jurisdiction over any firm whose activity is intended
to affect, and actually did affect, the U.S. domestic market. 155 This
standard for application of U.S. antitrust law is very broad and nearly
a complete rejection of the American Banana rule. 1 56 Under Alcoa,
the United States could assert jurisdiction over wholly foreign entities
pursuing business enterprises with no direct connection to the United
States so long as there was an intended and actual effect on the U.S.
market because of those actions. 157
The U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the Alcoa rule as the law in Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp.158 The actual scope of the Alcoa test-just
how substantial the effect had to be to impose U.S. antitrust scrutiny
to the conduct-was left unresolved. 159
Since Alcoa, U.S. lawmaking bodies have focused on the scope of
the power of the United States to enforce the effects doctrine. In
1976, the Ninth Circuit partially rolled back the effects doctrine in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,160 reasoning that the
effects test of Alcoa was an incomplete statement of the law because it
did not consider international comity and the impact that U.S.
jurisdiction would have on other nations' interests. 16 1 To balance the
interests of other countries, the Ninth Circuit adopted a
"jurisdictional rule of reason' 162 where the interests of the United
States in applying its antitrust law under the effects doctrine is
weighed against the injuries to the foreign jurisdiction in being
163
subject to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.

154.

Id.
Id. at 444.
156.
See, e.g., Jalil K. Mehra, ExtraterritorialAntitrust Enforcement and the
Myth of InternationalConsensus, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 191, 204-05 (1999).
157.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44.
158.
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690, 704-05
(1962).
159.
Dean Brockbank, The 1995 InternationalAntitrust Guidelines: The Reach
of U.S. Antitrust Law Continues to Expand, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1996).
160.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
161.
Id. at 611-12.
162.
Joseph P. Griffin, E.C. and the U.S. Extraterritoriality:Activism and
Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 353, 363 (1994).
163.
The factors that a court should weigh in a Timberlane comity analysis
were adapted from the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law and include:
155.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
The nationality or allegiance of the parties;
The locations or principal places of business of the corporations;
The extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected
to achieve compliance;
The relative significance of effects on the United States as
compared to those elsewhere;
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Under Timberlane, in order to assert jurisdiction in an international
antitrust case, a court must first perform an Alcoa effects analysis to
164
determine whether there is a prima facie case to assert jurisdiction.
If there is, the court must then find that there is an actual injury and
consider the comity factors enunciated in Timberlane.165 There has
166
been dispute in the federal courts as to the wisdom of Timberlane.
Congress has also weighed in on the propriety of the Alcoa effects
test and the Timberlane interpretation of it. The 1982 Foreign Trade
Antitrust Act stated that, under the Alcoa test, to assert antitrust
jurisdiction over export commerce or wholly foreign conduct there
must be a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
U.S. commerce from the activity in question. 167 Thus, post-Alcoa,
U.S. lawmaking bodies have sought to limit the scope of
extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction by increasing the degree to
which a court must consider comity and the degree to which foreign
168
conduct affects the U.S. domestic market.
Responding to the other lawmaking branches, the U.S. Supreme
Court considered the scope of the comity analysis and the Alcoa
effects test in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California.169 In Hartford
Fire, the Court first noted the standard set forth in the 1982 Foreign
Trade Antitrust Act, accepting that it was "well established ...

that

the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States."'170 The Court then turned to the question of whether
international comity concerns were a bar to asserting jurisdiction
against the foreign insurance companies. 171 The Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit, holding that comity did not serve as a bar to

6.
7.
8.

The extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce;
The forseeability of such effect;
The relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States compared with conduct abroad.

Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-15 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 40).

164.
Id. at 613.
165.
McNeill, supra note 142, at 437 n.103.
166.
The Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have cited Timberlane approvingly
and accepted its method of inquiry into international comity issues. The Seventh
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have questioned the validity of Timberlane. Griffin, supra
note 162, at 363-64.
167.
Id. at 364.
168.
See 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2002).
169.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). In HartfordFire,
nineteen state Attorneys General, along with numerous private litigants, brought suit
against various U.S. and foreign insurance companies, alleging that the insurance
companies had agreed to alter terms of insurance coverage sold through the United
Kingdom in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id.
170.
Id. at 796.
171.
Id. at 798-99.
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enforcement of the Sherman Act against the foreign insurance
companies. 172 The Court then went on to consider the applicability of
the Timberlane comity test and the degree to which comity should
generally be a bar to enforcement of the Sherman Act. 173 The Court
held that comity should only be a consideration where there is a "true
conflict" between U.S. and foreign law. 174 Citing Section 403 of the
Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, the
Court held that "no conflict exists . . . 'where a person subject to
' 175
regulations by two states can comply with the laws of both."
The Court's decision in Hartford Fire threw the law into
confusion. 176 What is clear, however, is that subsequent to the
decision, the role of comity in deciding jurisdiction in antitrust
enforcement cases has been substantially reduced. 177 Under the
decision, courts are only to consider the issue when there is a direct
conflict of laws-that is, where the laws of one jurisdiction compel
action that is illegal in another jurisdiction.17 8 What is nearly
undisputed is that the Timberlane analysis that focused on
international comity is reduced in significance. 1 79 While some courts,
most notably the Ninth Circuit, 80 continue to follow the Timberlane
comity analysis, others have effectively rejected the comity analysis in
considering jurisdictional issues after Hartford Fire.'8 ' However,
Hartford Fire indicates a greater willingness on the part of the U.S.
Supreme Court to reject much of the comity analysis and focus more
narrowly on U.S. national antitrust interests and their application
8 2
and enforcement extraterritorially

172.
Id. at 799.
173.
Id. at 797-99.
174.
Id. at 798.
175.
Id. at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 403 cmt. e (1987)).

176.
See, e.g., Mehra, supra note 156, at 192.
177.
See id. at 195.
178.
McNeill, supra note 142, at 440.
179.
Id.; see also Brockbank, supra note 159, at 12; John H. Chung, Comment,
The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act and the Maelstrom
Surrounding the ExtraterritorialApplication of the Sherman Act, 69 TEMP. L. REV.
371, 398-99 (1996); Varun Gupta, Note, After HartfordFire: Antitrust and Comity, 84
GEO. L.J. 2287, 2299 (1996).
180.
Metro Indus. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the Timberlane comity analysis was still appropriate, even considering the
holding in Hartford Fire).
181.
United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997);
Filetech S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom, 978 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
182.
HartfordFire, 509 U.S. at 797-98 (1993).
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B. The EU and ExtraterritorialApplication of European Competition
Law
The competition laws in the European Union regulate behavior
that "may affect trade between Member States"'18 3 or that "has an
anticompetitive effect 'in the Common Market."' 184 In this sense, the
European Union is the rough equivalent of the United States in its
formulation of comity and extraterritorial application of competition
law. 185 Similar to the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Act in the United
States, the European Union also includes a provision that requires
that challenged trade practices between Member States have more
than a de minimis effect on trade, 8 6 though it can be "direct or
18 7
indirect, actual or potential."'
In practice, the EU reaction to jurisdictional matters in antitrust
enforcement proceedings has been similar to that of the United
States-international comity concerns take a back seat to
enforcement of EU competition laws.' 88 The Wood Pulp decision' 8 9 is
indicative of the European response to jurisdictional issues. 190 In the
case, the wood pulp defendants claimed that the European Court of
Justice had no jurisdiction over them because they were not located
They further claimed that applying EU
within the Union. 191
competition rules to them would be a violation of the public
international law duty of non-interference. 192 They argued that one
U.S.-based wood pulp manufacturer was organized as a WebbPomerene export association 193 and because the association was legal
in the United States, it should not be illegal under EU competition

183.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 85(1), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
184.
Id.
The jurisdictional issues in Europe and the United States are roughly
185.
equivalent, except that the Sherman Act specifically prohibits practices in trade or
commerce "with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. There is no counterpart to this
language in the Treaty. Griffin, supra note 162, at 354.
186.
Id.
187.
Id.
Compare infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text, with Griffin, supra
188.
note 162, at 357.
189.
Case 89/85, In Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. AhIstrom Oy v. E.C. Commission,
1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1998). In the case, the Commission alleged that a
number non-EU producers of wood pulp conspired to fix prices of wood pulp within the
European Union in violation of the Union's competition laws. Griffin, supra note 162,
at 355.
190.
Griffin, supra note 162, at 356.
In Re Wood Pulp, 4 C.M.L.R. at 939.
191.
Id. at 940.
192.
193.
The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 exempts export associations from the
reach of the Sherman Act where the association is formed "for the sole purpose of
engaging in export trade." 15 U.S.C. § 62 (2002).
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law. 194 The European Court of Justice rejected both of these
claims. 195 According to the court, the decisive factor that permitted
the European Union to assert jurisdiction was that "[t]he producers
196
implemented their pricing agreement within the common market."'
Furthermore, the court found that "[i]t is immaterial whether or not
they had recourse to subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents, or branches
within the Community in order to make their contacts with
purchasers within the Community."'197 This has been called the
Similarly, the court rejected the
implementation doctrine. 198
defendant's non-interference claims, reasoning that the public
international duty of non-interference only applied where the duties
in one country were prohibited by the laws of another. 99 Here there
was no such conflict. 200 Even though the Webb-Pomerene export
association was statutorily exempt from the antitrust laws within the
United States, there was no requirement under U.S. law that they be
exempt from EU competition laws. 20 1 Therefore, there was no breach
of the duty of non-interference in applying EU laws to the
20 2
association.
On strict issues of international comity, the EU takes a narrow
view.20 3 The European Union has formally adopted the 1986 OECD
Recommendation for extraterritorial application of competition
laws. 20 4 The Recommendation focuses on "the need ... to give effect
to the principles of international law and comity and to use
moderation and self-restraint in the interest of cooperation in the
field of restrictive business practices." 20 5 In practice, however, the
European Court of Justice has adopted a view of international comity
more consistent with the limited view adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Hartford Fire.* In this regard, IBM v. Commission2 0 6 is
instructive. In IBM, the head of the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Justice Department asked that the Commission refrain from
imposing remedies against IBM because "they would constitute a
'quasi-confiscatorial' action that would be highly unfavorable to the

In Re Wood Pulp, 4 C.M.L.R. at 940.
194.
195.
Id. at 941.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
Griffin, supra note 162, at 356.
198.
In Re Wood Pulp, 4 C.M.L.R. at 941-42.
199.
Id. at 942.
200.
Id.
201.
Id.
202.
See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 162, at 361.
203.
Id. (citing Revised Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning
204.
Cooperation Between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting
Trade, .OECD Doc. No. C (86) 44 (Final) (May 21, 1986)).
205.
Id.
Case 60/81, IBM v. EC Commission, 1981 E.C.R. 2639, 3 C.M.L.R. 635
206.
(1981).
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U.S. trade position." 207 On appeal, IBM claimed that the decision
should be overturned because issues of international comity had not
been considered. 20 8 The European Court of Justice rejected this
comity claim holding that issues of international comity should not
even be considered until after a "decision" had been made. 20 9 This
holding by the court has narrowed the scope of international comity
within the Common Market. 210
The Directorate General IV (DG-IV)2 11 has taken a similar
position on international comity in merger control regulation. Most
notable was the politically charged merger consideration of Boeing
and McDonnell Douglas. 212 The first and third largest airplane
manufacturers in the world, both U.S. companies with no production
facilities in Europe, sought to merge. 2 18 Given the scope of the
proposed merger, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission decided to
investigate. 214 Concluding that the merger would not "substantially
lessen competition," the Commission gave its approval for the
However, the DG2IV also investigated the case to
merger. 2 15
determine whether the merger complied with EU competition law,
despite the fact that neither company had production facilities in
Europe. 216 Allegations that the European Union was attempting to
protect its domestic industry, Airbus, from legitimate competition
with the combined Boeing and McDonnell Douglas were made and,
for a time, there was talk of a trade war between the United States
and the European Union over the merger. 217 Eventually, after
Boeing made merger concessions to the European Union, the DG-IV
2 18
eventually approved the merger.
Even though the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger secured EU
approval, the longer-term impact for international antitrust

Griffin, supra note 162, at 357.
207.
IBM, 3 C.M.L.R. at 658.
208.
Id. at 662.
209.
210.
Griffin, supra note 162, at 359.
211.
The DG-IV is the body charged with the enforcement of Articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty of Rome, the principal competition statutes of the European Union. It
plays a role similar to the role that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
plays in the United States.
An excellent analysis of the issues, both legal and political, presented in
212.
the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger is Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European
Commission's Decision on the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for
Greater U.S.-E. U. Cooperation in the Merger Field, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1029 (1998).
Id. at 1030.
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
215.
Id.
216.
Id. at 1031-32. For a cogent discussion of the broader potential impact of
217.
trans-Atlantic civil aircraft competition and the political consequences arising
therefrom, see Daniel I. Fisher, Note, "Super Jumbo" Problem:Boeing, Airbus, and the
Battle for the GeopoliticalFuture, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865 (2002).
218.
Id. at 1034.
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jurisdiction was dramatic because of the simple assertion of
jurisdiction by the European Union. From this poifit on one could
reasonably assume that the European Union would, in future merger
cases, continue to assert jurisdiction over companies outside of
Europe. Such assertions of jurisdiction arguably took on even greater
significance in the European review of the proposed GE-Honeywell
merger in 2001.219 There, EU review of the case went one step
beyond Boeing-McDonnell Douglas when the European Union
formally sought to block the merger. 220 This ultimately scuttled the
22
deal. 1
The European response in the Wood Pulp Case, IBM, BoeingMcDonnell Douglas, and GE-Honeywell is emblematic of the
similarities in perceived jurisdiction and international comity
between the European Union and the United States.
Both
jurisdictions have confronted the problems of extraterritorial
application, and each initially took a relatively territorial approach to
enforcement of their antitrust laws. 222 However, as each jurisdiction
has confronted additional cases, each has seen the need to move away
from strict territoriality toward extraterritorial application in some
form. 223 The United States has adopted the "effects" test and the
2 24
European Union has formulated the "implementation" doctrine.
Commentators have emphasized the similarity between the two
standards. A former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division noted that the European Union's implementation
doctrine is "very close to, if not indistinguishable
from, the so-called
225
'effects' test as applied by U.S. courts.
There has been a similar convergence between the United States
and the European Union on the issue of international comity. Stated
simply, as the two authorities widen their jurisdiction to claim power
to consider extraterritorial antitrust matters, there has been a
consequent narrowing of their consideration of international
comity. 22 6 This is a natural and almost necessary outcome and there
is a direct correlation between the degree of extraterritoriality that a
jurisdiction perceives within its laws and the scope of deference it will

219.
See EU Commission ProhibitsGE's Acquisition of Honeywell (July 3, 2001),
available at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2001/2001052.htm.

220.

Id.

221.
Id.
222.
See supra notes 143, 188 and accompanying text.
223.
See generally supra notes 142-221 and accompanying text.
224.
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
225.
Griffin, supra note 162, at 170 (quoting Asst. Atty. General Charles F.
Rule, The Justice Department's Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations-A Competition Policy For the 1990s, Address Before the International
Trade Section and Antitrust Committee of the District of Columbia Bar, Washington
D.C. (Nov. 29, 1998)).
226.
See supra notes 142-218 and accompanying text.
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give to international comity concerns. In this trade-off, both the
expanded
United
States
and
the
European
Union
have
2 27
extraterritoriality at the expense of international comity.
The United States and the European Union are the two
superpowers in world antitrust regimes.
While there are other
significant bodies and countries with antitrust laws, no other
authority approaches either the United States or the European Union
in influence or the degree to which their respective antitrust regimes
have evolved, both in this scope of their antitrust jurisprudence and
their assertions of the extraterritorial application of their antitrust
laws. 228 Furthermore, as globalization advances, it may be that other
countries will continue to develop their own sets of antitrust laws and
will turn to either the U.S. or the EU model for guidance. Thus, over
time, some have suggested that there will appear two competing
blocks of antitrust laws, one based on the U.S. antitrust ideals of open
and competitive markets and the other based on the EU model of
integrated European and world markets. 229 As each of these blocks of
antitrust law evolve, they should continue on the path of increased
extraterritoriality and decreased comity. This is consistent with the
nature of a globalized world economy.
With a more globally
integrated world, business decisions that may appear at first blush to
have a purely domestic impact will be shown, upon deeper analysis, to
have a more global impact. In such a case, the foreign antitrust
authority arguably should have standing to bring actions against the
domestic firm for such decisions, based solely on justifications of
national sovereignty. If it were otherwise, the domestic firm would be
allowed to make decisions that impact the foreign economy without
that foreign government having any effective oversight. Such an
outcome would fly in the face of any traditional understanding of
national sovereignty.
With the increased world acceptance of extraterritoriality, the
underlying economies in which these antitrust laws are applied will
begin to converge. The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger is the
classic example of this. As Boeing made concessions to the European
Union to win acceptance of the merger, the combined company
evolved in a manner that is acceptable under both U.S. and EU
antitrust law. This type of strong extraterritoriality with major
antitrust regimes suggests a remedy to the problems of global
antitrust.

227.
See id.
228.
There are many different antitrust regimes outside of the United States
and the European Union aside from the ones discussed above. Among them are
Korea, Japan, and China. However, these other regimes have not evolved to the
advanced stages of the U.S. and the EU regimes.
229.
Waller, supra note 2, at 343-50.
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V. USING THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF GLOBAL ANTITRUST TO EXPLAIN
PAST INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PROBLEMS AND TO PREDICT FUTURE
SUCCESS

The economic model of international antitrust is a powerful tool
to explain difficulties inherent in attempting to develop an
international body responsible for enforcing global antitrust
standards or to house such a body within an existing global
institution. It posits that some countries would bear disproportionate
burdens if they were to join such an organization. 230 It further
suggests, however, that there is a path to coordination of the different
antitrust laws1 of various jurisdictions through the forging of bilateral
23
agreements.
Historical evidence supports the economic model of international
antitrust. Not only have global efforts failed, but regional efforts
have also flourished.2 3 2 The agreements between the European
Union and United States and the agreements within the NAFTA
nations are but two examples of bilateral agreements that work to
establish mutually acceptable international antitrust standards.
According to the model, the most advantageous path for the future
233
continues to be the development of workable bilateral agreements.
Furthermore, the model cautions against further efforts to establish a
global antitrust authority. Such efforts are likely to be a fruitless
waste of time.
Problems remain even if suggestions for a single global antitrust
authority are eschewed. Most notably, different antitrust laws in
different jurisdictions pose enormous costs for international
corporations. This is evident not only in the duplication of efforts to
get international mergers approved by multiple jurisdictions applying
multiple sets of laws, but also in day-to-day antitrust compliance.
The path to alleviate or eliminate these continuing problems
should be the guiding long-term goal of antitrust coordination efforts.
First, the continued
Two potential remedies seem attractive.
development of bilateral agreements similar to those already in place
should be pursued. Through these agreements, there has already
been a reduction in business costs attributable to antitrust
compliance. Microsoft is but one example. 234 Microsoft consented to
joint information sharing between the United States and the
European Union in their cases against the company. 235 This joint

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See supra notes 57-80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text
See supra notes 81-141 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
Keegan, supra note 16, at 176.
Id.

1018

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 35:989

effort led to a joint consent decree
that benefited all parties by
23 6
reducing the cost of compliance.
The other, more radical and longer-term solution to alleviate the
high business costs associated with international antitrust
compliance is continued and stronger extraterritorial application of
domestic antitrust laws. The American Banana doctrine of strict
territoriality is not only dead, it is also unworkable in a global
economy. 23 7 Strictly territorial application of domestic antitrust laws
makes those laws useless against multinational corporations. 238
Furthermore, countries have a vital interest in seeing that their
antitrust laws are enforced against defendants whose conduct affects
their markets. 23 9 Both U.S. and foreign courts recognize this basic
fact and have interpreted their antitrust laws to give effect to the
principles of extraterritoriality. 240 In the United States, starting with
the effects doctrine, continuing with the Timberlane rule of reason,
and culminating in the adoption of the HartfordFire rule, courts have
de-emphasized the principles of comity and adopted strong-form
principles of extraterritoriality. 241 The same basic principle242is at
work in the European Union with the implementation doctrine.
Over the long run, global adoption of extraterritoriality will help
antitrust laws and underlying economies evolve together. This was
the result in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger dispute before
the European Union. To the United States, the proposed merger
posed no problem; however, this was not the case in the European
Union. Applying its antitrust laws extraterritorially, the European
Union deemed the merger as it was originally announced to be
against its own antitrust interests. While there were obvious political
overtones to the dispute, eventually the United States and Boeing
recognized the interests of the European Union in participating in
merger scrutiny. 243 Ultimately, the bargain that was struck made the

236.

Id. at 171.

237.
See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
238.
See, e.g., Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 416. With purely territorial application of
antitrust laws, no country could assert regulatory powers over a multinational
corporation in the full scope of its activities. Arguably, then, such a multinational
corporation could be said to exist above the laws of any one jurisdiction. At the very
least, this contradicts the fundamental understanding in Western liberal democracies
that business is always subject to the regulatory oversight of government.
239.
If countries do not have the power or authority to regulate those activities
that "affect" their market, much of the traditional concept of national sovereignty is
undercut. Control of the national marketplace is the essence of sovereignty.
240.
See supra Part IV.
See supra notes 142-82 and accompanying text.
241.
See supra Part IV.B.
242.
243.
This should be politically obvious, as no trans-Atlantic trade wars started
as a product of EU scrutiny of the merger.
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merger acceptable under both U.S. and EU law. 2 4 4
Thus, the
underlying U.S. economy evolved also, albeit only slightly and very
slowly, through the extraterritorial application of EU antitrust law to
U.S. corporations. Over the long run, as extraterritoriality becomes
settled precedent, there is likely to be less political backlash against
such antitrust enforcement and a quickening of the convergence
245
between rival economies and rival sets of antitrust laws.
The evolution of international antitrust will not be smooth-the
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger example proves this. Indeed,
countries will find it a breach of their own sovereignty when another
246
country seeks to assert jurisdiction over its domestic companies.
247
This has certainly been the case in the post-Hartford Fire world.
To thwart the holding in Hartford Fire, some other countries have
passed blocking statutes, meant to block discovery outside of the
United States in the foreign jurisdiction. 2 48 By passing such blocking
statutes, the foreign government introduces a "true conflict 2 49 as
understood in Hartford Fire. When there is such a true conflict,
Hartford Fire requires that courts give deference to the principles of
comity.2 50
Going forward, if the United States-or any other
jurisdiction-seeks to continue to adhere to principles of
extraterritoriality, there should be an expectation of at least some
foreign resistance to the endeavor.
Governments can respond to foreign objections in two ways.
First, they can reject Hartford Fire-style extraterritoriality, and readopt a doctrine more deferential to international comity. Such an
approach is dangerous, however. Extraterritoriality can serve as one
of the foundations of a truly global antitrust system. Reverting to
older standards that give more deference to international comity
concerns undermines this path to global antitrust. Furthermore,
given the near impossibility of setting up one global organization for
antitrust enforcement, extraterritoriality is an attractive option for
evolving towards shared global antitrust solutions.
Rather than recoil at resistance to extraterritoriality, the United
States and other jurisdictions could instead respond to it. When other
jurisdictions pass blocking statutes to thwart extraterritoriality and
invoke comity, courts could instead seek alternative means to avoid

244.
If the merger had not been acceptable under either jurisdiction's antitrust
law, then the merger would have been challenged in court.
245.
Obviously, as the GE-Honeywell example shows, such a pacific reception to
extraterritorial jurisdiction may only occur over the very long-term.
246.
Joseph P. Griffin, Jurisdiction and Enforcement: Foreign Governmental
Reactions to U.S. Assertions of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV.
505, 505 (1998).
247.
Id. at 514.
248.
Id. at 522.
249.
See Hartford Fire,509 U.S. at 798.
250.
Id. at 794-99.
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true conflicts. Courts could, for example, impose a good faith test on
potential foreign conflicts. Only where a court determines that
foreign blocking statutes were passed in good faith and represent a
national interest beyond avoiding U.S. extraterritoriality should the
conflict be given Hartford Fire true-conflict deference. Where such
conflicts are only erected as a barrier to U.S. jurisdiction, the conflict
could be disregarded. Obviously, this may be putting "the fox in
charge of the hen house," as U.S. courts may be predisposed to find
jurisdiction. However, the U.S. interest in applying its laws against
any plaintiff whose conduct affects U.S. markets is too great to be
thwarted by blocking statutes. Such an interpretation of a true
conflict under Hartford Fire would pay due deference to international
comity concerns while still permitting the United States the power to
apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially.
Efforts to globalize antitrust enforcement have a long history.
Unfortunately, that history is marked more by failure than success.
Idealistic goals of a single antitrust authority continue to butt up
against the realities of a global system still based on interactions
among nation-states. Suggestions like those made by Klein, and
supported in one form or another by other antitrust authorities,
should be disregarded as unworkable and unachievable in practice.
Instead, the path to true global antitrust should be pursued through
bilateral agreements and application of extraterritoriality to
multinational corporations. Such efforts will ultimately lead to the
evolution of a true global antitrust system that will benefit all parties.
William Sugden*

* J.D./MBA Candidate, 2003, Vanderbilt University Law School, Owen Graduate
School of Management; B.A., Kenyon College.

